What the Karabakh war renewal may bring

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Following the UN’s recognition of Kosovo’s independence in May this year, the process of determining the fate of the “blank-spots” in the post-Soviet space – including Nagorno-Karabakh – may accelerate.

Armenia, with its strong world lobby is likely to push a number of states towards recognition of Nagorno-Karabakh’s independence, possibly through the use of serious financial incentives. However, any large-scale attempt by Yerevan’s to gain recognition for Nagorno-Karabakh will certainly trigger a serious response by Baku. The Azeri Government’s counter measures would develop in two directions: firstly, at an official level, Baku would use all its diplomatic leverage in international organizations – the UN, the OSCE and the EU – to hinder the recognition of the occupied Nagorno-Karabakh by any world state. Secondly, there is certainly a risk that Azerbaijan may attempt to forcefully restore its control over the territories that it controlled as the Soviet Republic of Azerbaijan. Should this occur, the consequences for the countries of the South Caucasus would be disastrous.

Presently, Azerbaijan’s military forces - including the army, and interior and frontier armed forces - are made up of about 150,000 men, and, as Azeri politicians have declared, the Azeri state military budget exceeds the total budget of Armenia. However, the size of its army and its huge military budget do not guarantee complete victory. Officials in Baku should take into account that in any battle over Nagorno-Karabakh, it will have to face not only Karabakh Armenians, but regular Armenian army units including Russian military specialists presently serving at the Russian military bases in Armenia.

Baku has already foreseen the abovementioned problems, however the Azeri Government is worried about another important issue – if wide-scale military actions do resume in Nagorno-Karabakh and other Azeri-Armenian borders, will Tbilisi allow Russian forces pass its territory?

The Armenian army has found itself in isolated on all sides – it has been gathering armaments and military equipment over recent years, with a comparable arsenal possessed by the Russian base in Gyumri. However, as a rule, in all wide-scale and drawn-out wars, it is necessary for combatants to access supplies such as: cartridges, shells, mines, bombs or fuel. Therefore, it is possible that if war erupts in Nagorno-Karabakh, Moscow will try to send additional military equipment and supplies to Armenia via Georgian military highway.

It is possible that Armenia and Russia might attempt to route supplies through Iran, however this route is slower and Iran will try to maintain neutrality, as millions of ethnic Azeris live on its territory.

Therefore, the only feasible air and land supply route would be via Georgia. After the August war of 2008, Russian military airplanes have been using Georgia’s airspace to transport materials to Armenia. As for using Georgia as a land route, Moscow might attempt to move supplies from any of three directions – from Lars, Tskhinvali and Abkhazia. Technically, it may look like this – despite the protests of Tbilisi officials, Russian units currently occupying Akhalgori will block the Mtskheta-Khashuri road. At the same time, via the Roki Tunnel, Russian forces could enter Georgia and reach Armenia after passing Borjomi, Akhalgori and Akhalkalaki accompanied by armored squadrons and air-defense forces.

There is a second, more hazardous route – Russian military forces may use force to enter Armenia, by trying to reach Rustavi and Marneuli via Tbilisi. If Tbilisi chooses a policy of surrender and opens its roads to the Russian military, then the military conflict might be avoided, though Georgia’s currently friendly relations with Azerbaijan may be lost for a very long time.

A wide-scale war in mountainous Karabakh would not be in Georgia’s interest for other reasons: There will definitely be armed clashes at the Azeri-Armenian border, including in the area of the Red Bridge, there is definitely a risk that during the inevitable artillery exchange, Georgian citizens may be injured. After the last warm meeting of the presidents of Georgia and Azerbaijan, Baku awaits the final position of the Georgian Government concerning the issue with trepidation.

Story by Irakli Aladashvili, Editor-in-chief of the military analytical magazine “Arsenali”

29.07.2010